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In Federalist 51, James Madison explained the American political system’s primary
mechanism to prevent one branch of government from absorbing the powers and authorities of
another. He wrote, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man,
must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.”1 In other words, the members of
each branch of government need to have a strong interest in protecting their constitutional
prerogatives. If all three branches of government jealously protect their power, then they will
inevitably counter each other and the proper balance between them will be maintained. As a
matter of pure theory, Madison’s argument here makes perfect sense. However, American
political history has not been kind to Madison’s faith in institutional ambition, at least in the
sense that he meant it. Clearly, members remain ambitious by some standards. Average
congressional terms are longer than ever and interpretations of Congress’ policy making power
under Article One have grown considerably broader.2 Still, contemporary Congresses have been
less willing to take ownership of their legislative duties. Authorities that were traditionally in
Congress’s domain, such as the war power and various forms of oversight power, have been
claimed by the executive branch and Congress has done little to fight back. Moreover, modern
congressional acquiescence presents a serious challenge to Madison’s theory, and this paper
seeks to explain this through a broad historical study of congressional decline.
I will begin by analyzing Madison’s Federalist essays on the separation of powers as well
as the Anti-Federalist criticisms of his theory, and then discuss Tocqueville’s concerns about
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centralization and the nature of democratic citizenship. Furthermore, I will also address modern
explanations for the legislature’s decline with a particular focus on work that deals with
polarization. Finally, by detailing the weakening of Congress throughout American history with
an emphasis on twentieth century politics, I will argue that the informal breakdown of
constitutional norms, along the weakness of modern citizenship and partisan polarization, have
rendered Madison’s ambition theory ineffective.
Madison’s Theory of Separated Powers
One of the primary criticisms of the proposed government’s structure following the
Constitutional Convention of 1787 was that it allowed the separate branches of government to
mix excessively.3 Many feared that this would lead to the consolidation of federal power, and
eventually despotic rule. For example, prominent Anti-Federalist George Mason argued that the
new Constitution “mixed too much the Legislative and Executive,” and that this would
eventually result in one dominating the other.4 This concern was a staple in Anti-Federalist
rhetoric throughout the convention and during ratification debates.5 Madison’s best theoretical
responses to these arguments can be found in Federalist 47 through 51, where he addressed the
separation of powers concept explicitly and articulated his theory of institutional behavior based
on man’s tendency towards self interested “ambition.” 6
In these essays, Madison is quick to endorse the idea “that the legislative, executive, and
judiciary departments, ought to be separate and distinct.”7 He points to Montesquieu’s theory of
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government as justification for this concept, and makes clear that he is sympathetic to the
sentiment being expressed by critics of the proposed Constitution. Still, he pointed out that their
assessments of the document were flawed. Madison wrote that, in terms of explicit grants of
authority, the ability of each branch to interfere with the affairs of the others was limited to
checking excesses and preventing arbitrary action. In other words, no branch could perform the
duties of another on its own accord.8 Congress could not initiate executive action, the Supreme
Court could enforce no law, and the President could not legislate. Furthermore, each of the state
constitutions allowed for a degree of collaboration between the separate branches, and many of
them permitted far more than the proposed federal Constitution did.
All of this being said, Madison made clear that these mere “parchment barriers,” no
matter how strong, were not enough to prevent one branch of government from absorbing the
powers of another over time.9 His solution to this problem, as mentioned in the introduction, was
to rely on the members of each branch to be devoted enough to the power and legitimacy of their
institution to use their ample constitutional authorities to defend against usurpation. The efforts
of Congressmen and Senators to maximize their own power would actually ensure a proper
distribution of authority within the federal government. This is the “ambition must be made to
counteract ambition” concept.10 Ironically, Madison was far more concerned about the legislative
branch becoming the dominant force in American government, particularly at the expense of the
executive. He argued that in a republican system of government with no monarch, the possibility
of “legislative usurpation” should be the primary concern.11 This is of course hard to reconcile
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with the contemporary state of American government, where Congress has been more than
willing to cede its power to the President and to bureaucratic agencies in the executive branch.
Given the obvious tension between Madison’s theory and Congress’s gradual decline in power, a
number of scholars and writers have sought to tackle the question of whether or not Madison’s
understanding of institutional ambition as a defense against consolidation still has, or ever did
have, merit as a way to understand interbranch relations. Furthermore, discerning the answer to
this question is a crucial part of understanding the future of American government, and more
specifically Congress’s ability to fulfill its constitutional role going forward.
Critiques of Madison’s Theory: Past and Present
An early, but poignant, criticism of Madison’s theory can be found in the Anti-Federalist
essays of Centinel, which were probably authored by Samuel Bryan of Pennsylvania.12 While
Centinel’s work actually predates the publication of the Federalist, it still provides a clear
counterargument to the political theory of Federalist 51. Centinel’s essay was actually written in
response to John Adams, who had published an article arguing in favor of a prototypical version
of Madison’s ambition theory.13 Moreover, Centinel’s arguments foreshadow future criticisms of
Madisonian political thought and demonstrate skepticism towards the virtue of self-interest in
republican government. Centinel’s key assertion was that a government with three branches and
considerable authority could not be reasonably expected to direct “ambition...to the prejudice of
the public good.”14 Centinel thought that it was beyond the capacity of fallible human beings to
balance authority between the three branches well enough so that one branch would not become
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too powerful at the expense of the others. If Madison’s assumption that public officials will be
intensely self interested is correct, then Centinel’s concern here becomes even more relevant.15
Moreover, even if the Framers were able to create a perfect balance between each branch,
Centinel argued that this would be insufficient to prevent the consolidation of federal power on
its own. A public willing to maintain a watchful eye over the government would also be
necessary, and the “views and interests” of each branch would have to be diverse enough to
prevent “a coalition of any two of them for the destruction of the third.”16 While nothing like this
has exactly happened, partisan coalitions between members of Congress and the president have
prevented Congress from defending its institutional interests on numerous occasions.17
Furthermore, it is not controversial to assert that the American public has been a fairly
unattentive watchdog in the modern era.18 Centinel would likely blame this failure of citizenship,
at least in part, on the complexity of the federal system. He argued that the Constitution’s
structural intention to pit ambition against ambition makes it harder for citizens to determine
exactly who is responsible for the government’s failings, and thus harder for them to hold certain
actors accountable.19 In theory, this would leave the door open for one part of the federal
government to aggrandize itself far more easily.
To bring this work into the context of modern congressional weakness, Centinel’s
arguments have some merit as well as some shortcomings. Throughout American history, the
way that certain provisions of the Constitution have been interpreted has changed considerably.
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While congressional authority under the Commerce Clause and the Elastic Clause has expanded,
so has presidential power under Article Two. While drafting a constitution that balances
authority between the branches properly is hard enough on its own, as Centinel points out, it
becomes impossible when interpretations of this authority are constantly changing.20
Furthermore, this is a big part of why the informal changes that took place in American
government during the early 20th century resulted in the legislature’s subordination to the
executive branch. Madison’s implicit checks were unable to prevent this, and Centinel’s work
goes far in explaining why.
That said, Centinel seems to overestimate the ability of the citizenry to limit the
government.21 In the essay, Centinel is trying to persuade the public not to support a more
powerful central government in pursuit of economic well being. At the same time, he is arguing
that the public is capable of keeping one branch of government from infringing on the authority
of the others.22 These things do not seem to fit together. Encouraging institutional competition
among elites in government is quite obviously not foolproof. Still, it is more likely to resist the
consolidation of federal power than a public that is more concerned with the substance of
government action than with the process by which it occurs. Public demand for federal
intervention into economic affairs provided Congress with a strong incentive to delegate power
to regulatory agencies throughout the 20th century, and it seems that Centinel’s more democratic
model likely would have expedited this process.
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Another early observer of American politics, Alexis de Tocqueville, shared a number of
Centinel’s concerns. However, because Tocqueville intended to be an observer, unlike Centinel,
who was an advocate, Tocqueville’s arguments are more nuanced. Moreover, Tocqueville also
had the advantage of writing several decades after the Constitution was ratified, which meant he
had far more to work with in assessing how American government actually functioned. While
never addressing Madison’s theory directly, Tocqueville seemed to take issue with Madison’s
view of ambition in republican societies.23 Tocqueville argued that, in monarchies and
aristocracies, there is a natural urge among members of the ruling class to pursue glory and
power.24 In self-governing societies, however, he asserted that this sentiment is far less common,
especially long term.25 While this certainly comes with considerable benefits, for example
peaceful transitions of power, it also presents a problem for Madison’s theory. Tocqueville
argues that as conditions become more equal and government becomes more democratic, “lofty
ambition” tends to die out.26 If this is correct, then it means that the bedrock of separated powers
in American government is founded on a fleeting sentiment. Tocqueville indicates that whatever
ambition does remain in the public becomes geared towards physical gratification and economic
prosperity, and concern over republican principles tend to take a backseat.27
Furthermore, Tocqueville’s view of democratic ambition ties in directly with his concerns
about centralization and democratic citizenship. Tocqueville wrote that “the intellect of
democratic nations is peculiarly open to simple and general notions...its favorite conception is
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that of a great nation...governed by a single power.”28 This appears to be a symptom of the sort of
narrow and individualistic ambition that Tocqueville accurately attributes to democratic
societies. If this is true, then a self-governing nation will tend to centralize its politics at every
level possible despite the existence of constitutional guardrails, or as Madison would call them,
“parchment barriers.”29 Essentially, this means the consolidation of federal authority. Moreover,
with the President being the only nationally elected official in the federal government, it makes
sense that the democratic push for simplicity would empower the executive branch at the
expense of others. Furthermore, Tocqueville’s understanding of ambition goes far in explaining
the unraveling of Madison’s theory in the early 20th century, and is crucial to consider when
looking at congressional decline in that era.
While most modern approaches to the question of congressional weakness have had more
to do with the structure of government and institutional behavior, a few others have sought to
analyze Madison’s assumptions about self interest and ambition to explain this phenomenon, and
these are most relevant to this project. For example, in Jeffrey Becker’s Ambition in America, he
takes a critical look at Federalist 51 in the context of modern citizenship and makes
Tocquevillian arguments.30 Becker argues that if the public is willing to meaningfully engage
with politics, then this “ambition strengthens both the formal institutions of government, as well
as the reciprocal relationships at the heart of democratic politics.”31 This is important, as the
legislative branch is generally regarded as the most democratic of the three, and the House of
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Representatives as the most democratic institution. Because of this, the character of Congress is
reflective of the public, at least to some extent. According to Becker’s logic, if the citizenry is
ambitious, then the sort of ambition that Madison thought vital will likely be exemplified by
members of Congress and his system, which is reliant on competing interests, could work.
However, if citizens become unengaged and uninterested in all public affairs aside from
elections, then Congress takes on this character as well. This leaves a power vacuum between the
branches that inevitably gets filled. This is essentially Tocqueville’s argument, Becker simply
has more historical evidence to support it.32
Much like Centinel, moreover, Becker voices concern over the role of self-interested
ambition in republican government.33 This becomes magnified when the amount of ambition
between branches or institutions is unequal. Again, if the citizenry becomes careless about the
actual workings of politics, as Tocqueville feared they would and many scholars would argue
they have, then the kind of republican ambition that Madison envisioned is likely to take on a
much different form. While the Framers were under no impression that self-interested
individuals with a will to power would not exist, they assumed that enough of them would be
around to counter each other. An inattentive public combined with a lack of ambitious public
officials leaves only the “parchment barriers” that Madison himself admitted were insufficient.34
Furthermore, while Becker’s work does not focus specifically on the decline of Congress at the
expense of the executive branch, it gives significant insight into the reasons why this has
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happened and largely aligns with the criticisms of Madison forwarded by Tocqueville and
Centinel.
Scholarship on Congressional Decline, Executive Growth, and Administrative Control
A number of contemporary scholars have sought to explain congressional weakness as a
consequence of member behavior rather than as a result of theoretical flaws in the institution’s
design. While few of these works directly reference Madison’s ambition theory, they still go far
in explaining its flaws as they have materialized throughout American history. For example,
political scientist Yuval Levin succinctly argues that “Congress is weak because its members
want it to be.”35 While the increasing power of the presidency and the bureaucracy are often cited
as reasons for the recession of congressional influence, Levin points out that Congress began to
empower the executive branch on its own accord early in the twentieth century.36 Therefore,
Congress has not been the victim of executive power, but rather an architect of it. According to
Levin, modern members of Congress have been just as complicit in their institution’s steady
decline, despite the frequent partisan complaints of a few members.37 While more geared towards
a general audience, his work is useful for understanding the broad pattern of institutional decline
within Congress.
Other scholars, for example Norman Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann, have attributed the
House and Senate’s “decline in institutional identity” and both institutions’ general “resistance”
to meaningful reform as crucial factors contributing to congressional decline in the modern era.38

Yuval Levin, "Congress Is Weak Because Its Members Want It to Be Weak,” Commentary, June 2018, 1.
Levin, 1.
37
Levin, 1.
38
Thomas E. Mann, and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress is Failing
America and How to Get It Back on Track, (Oxford University Press, 2006), 54.
35
36

10

For example, members of the House of Representatives have traditionally had an almost jealous
pride in their institution because it is considered to be the lower house, and less prestigious than
the Senate.39 No matter how frivolous this may seem on the surface, Ornstein and Mann point out
that this was a critical component of the House’s will to protect its institutional powers.40 While
their approach differs, Ornstein and Mann’s argument is similar to Becker and Tocqueville’s. If
the public provides Congress with no incentive to display institutional pride or strength, then
they will not.
Some more recent literature attributes congressional dysfunction to the increase of elite
polarization along party lines. Kathryn Pearson writes that in contemporary politics, “the two
parties have grown increasingly competitive and polarized.”41 This assertion is supported by a
plethora of evidence, and a considerable amount of research has been performed in an effort to
explain it.42 While not all of this research is relevant here, it is an unavoidable fact that
polarization has had significant consequences for the ability of Congress to perform its
constitutional functions and express institutional ambition. If members of Congress concern
themselves primarily with partisan divisions, then they will be less capable of uniting to defend
their institutional interests when necessary.43 This results in a warped incentive structure, where
delegating power to the President or the bureaucracy can be more fitting with the ambitions of
individual members of Congress than pursuing policy objectives through the legislative process.

39
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For example, a recent congressional effort to reclaim the war power fell flat because a number

of Republican members were unwilling to prioritize their branch over their party.45
Furthermore, while polarization can certainly explain some of the issues with modern
Congress, the history of congressional decline goes back much further than the partisan divide of
recent decades. For example, legal scholar Cass Sunstein writes about Congress’s delegation of
legislative power to the administrative state during the 1930’s when government was entirely
unified.46 While this was a time of economic crisis, Congress still willingly gave up its authority
over various areas of policy. Furthermore, as Louis Fisher points out, Congress also began to
abdicate its role in the war-making process and foreign policy in the early 1950s, when President
Truman went to war in Korea without approval or consequences.47 Again, there were no notable
polarizing forces in Congress that caused this inaction, members just did not want to cross the
President. Therefore, while concerns over the impact on increased partisan polarization are
entirely legitimate, they do not fully explain Congress’s initial willingness to delegate away its
constitutional authority.
Some writers have pointed to the expanding domain of the judiciary, particularly since
the 1960’s, as a culprit in the decline of Congress. For example, Raoul Berger wrote in 1977 that
the Supreme Court, and especially the Warren Court, had stretched out the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment so far as to assume legislative power for itself.48 Mark Tushnet, another
legal scholar, makes similar arguments in his criticisms of the modern Court, asserting that the
Gillian E. Metzger, "Agencies, Polarization, and The States," Columbia Law Review 115, no. 7 (2015), 1739.
Erich Beech, "Trump Vetoes Congressional Resolution to End U.S. Involvement in Yemen War," Reuters, April
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46
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growth of judicial review throughout the twentieth century weakened congressional legitimacy.49
More recently, political scientist Amanda Hollis-Brusky argues that the Courts have assumed a
much stronger role in the policymaking process in recent years, and that this exercise of
quasi-legislative authority inevitably results in a weaker Congress.50 As Eugene Hickock points
out, however, this is largely the fault of Congress, as they have plenty of constitutional authority
to bend the Court to its will.51 This was intentional in the design of the judiciary, and
contemporaries of the Framers were far more concerned that the Court would be abused by the
legislature.52 However, Congress has not demonstrated the political will to exercise these powers
and, absent of consequence, the Court has naturally become more active in certain policy areas.
Hollis-Brusky writes that, “individuals and organized interest groups are increasingly looking to
the judicial branch to carry out their policy agendas.”53 While it is true that the modern Supreme
Court has played a significant role in shaping policy debates, for example those regarding
abortion and campaign finance, Congress has done little to assert its institutional authority to
resist these decisions. Therefore, while the increasing influence of the Supreme Court in
policymaking is a consequence of congressional decline, it is not a legitimate cause of it.
Literature about the increase of executive power is also important to consider in this
context, as this increase has come at the expense of Congress. This work often looks at the
drastic changes that took place in government as a result of the Industrial Revolution, but also
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because of shifts in global politics and American demographics during the early twentieth
century. The need for these changes were encouraged early on, in 1885 to be exact, by political
scientist and future President Woodrow Wilson. In his famous book Congressional Government,
Wilson was highly critical of a rigid understanding of separated powers and voiced admiration
for the British Parliament which was based on party, rather than committee, and was led by the
Prime Minister, a figure with executive power.54 Wilson was also supportive of European models
of the administrative state and believed such systems were necessary to meeting public needs at
the turn of the century.55 He carried these views into his presidency, and his emphasis on
executive leadership in policymaking and a strong bureaucracy had a lasting impact on American
government that will be examined further in the analysis section of this paper.
Furthermore, there is a growing body of modern literature on executive power that builds
on the foundation of Wilsonian political thought and that is particularly worth examining in the
context of congressional weakness, as this work is crucial to determining the relevance of
Madison’s institutional design in contemporary politics. Dino Christenson and Douglas Kriner
sum up the recent scholarship on the relationship between the president and Congress well when
they write that “the legislature appears institutionally all but powerless to stop” presidential and
bureaucratic action.56 This is, of course, despite the legislature’s dominant legal powers. The
primary issue is, again, that the necessary institutional ambition does not exist, according to
Christenson and Kriner. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule’s The Executive Unbound: After the
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Madisonian Republic also casts serious doubt on the sustainability of Madison’s vision and gives
insight into the Progressive political thinking that brought about a weaker Congress.57 Posner and
Vermeule’s embracement of government by a president-led administrative state is Wilsonian to
its core, and also confirms the fears of political thinkers like Tocqueville. Christopher DeMuth
provides a counter-argument to the case by Posner and Vermeule, however he recognizes that
Congress has become weak for many of the same reasons they cite.58 Because of this consensus
on the trend of executive supremacy at the expense of Congress, both works are important to
reference.
Theory
The evidence that Congress has gotten progressively weaker over the last century is
overwhelming and obvious, and a scholarly consensus on this issue clearly exists. Furthermore, a
number of the factors addressed by political scientists and historians play some role in modern
Congress’s failure to perform its constitutional duties. The work of Pearson, Metzger, and
Theriault provides important insight into the nature of polarization in Congress, and their
theories are helpful for understanding Congress’s failure to prevent executive overreach during
both the Obama and Trump presidencies.59 Posner, Vermeule, and DeMuth’s emphasis on the
early Progressive era as a key period for congressional decline is also significant, as is Sunstein’s
analysis of the birth of the administrative state during the New Deal.60
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Moreover, it seems that the key to understanding the root of congressional decline, and
thus the failure of Madison’s ambition theory, lies not in an analysis of the institution’s current
rules and procedures. Rather, the answer appears to lie in understanding the political response to
several transformative events that have taken place throughout American history and which gave
birth to these rules and procedures. These include the Industrial Revolution and the Great
Depression, as both fundamentally altered the expectations and demands of the public. The
changes that took place as a result of both of these events significantly lowered the incentive for
members of Congress to express ambition in the sense that Madison and the Framers intended
them to. Madison’s theory of institutional ambition was always flawed in some ways, as
Tocqueville aptly demonstrated, and reliant on certain political circumstances to function
properly. That said, a detailed study of Congress and interbranch relations until the early
twentieth century provides some support for the merits of Madison’s theory. What has rendered
Madison’s theory obsolete in contemporary politics has been the combination of informal and
formal changes that were made to the Constitution starting in the Progressive era and that
continue into the present day.
Another factor worth mentioning with regards to congressional decline is the growing
allegiance to party over institution in contemporary politics and the role that partisan polarization
plays in stifling institutional pride and ambition. For example, if a Republican President takes
unilateral action that is a usurpation of legislative authority, a Republican Congress is unlikely to
do anything about it because of both partisan loyalty and individual members’ primary interest in
reelection.61 The growth of the administrative state in the 20th century and the legislative
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gridlock that has come as a result of polarization means that the bureaucracy is now the primary
mechanism through which public policy is made. In fact, it is now common for legislators to
lobby executive agencies rather than draft and introduce bills in their respective institutions.62
This is dangerous, and clearly demonstrates that the sort of ambition that Madison anticipated in
public officials has been warped, and this is now preventing the federal government from
functioning according to its constitutional mandate. The analysis section of this paper will take a
historical and developmental approach to make these arguments. I will start with briefly
analyzing the behavior of early Congresses in the late 18th and early 19th centuries with a
particular focus on the differences in the representative-constituent relationship that were present
during that era, and how this influences Congress's’ ability to express ambition. Then, I will look
at the legislative decline and the growth of the executive branch that came as a result several
transformative events that took place during first half of the 20th century. Through the lens of
Federalist 51, I will contend that the political responses to these events and problems with
modern citizenship form the basis for current congressional weakness. Finally, I will conclude
with a reflection on partisan polarization in Congress and the future of Madisonian government.
The Early Madisonian Congress
In order to properly explain and analyze the decline of Congress, it is necessary to first
look at how the legislative branch functioned in the decades following the Constitution’s
ratification. As noted in the literature review, most observers of American politics at the time
were far more concerned with the possibility of legislative tyranny, and executive overreach was
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something of an afterthought.63 This was likely a reflection of the Articles of Confederation’s
unreasonable emphasis on legislative supremacy, as well as public concern over the number of
elite figures who would inhabit Congress. Furthermore, it was widely understood that the
legislative branch possessed the exclusive ability to make law, and thus had significant control
over what the new federal government could actually do.
Some of the most significant figures in early American politics, for example Thomas
Jefferson and John Adams, recognized Congress as a sort of “natural aristocracy.”64 Almost all of
its members were wealthy, learned elites who carried enormous influence within their home
states and districts. While this might appear as a meaningless product of a less democratic era on
its face, Pasley points out that this meant Congressmen, and especially Senators, had little
incentive to pander to their constituencies.65 This inevitably changes the behavior of individual
members, and thus the nature of the institution itself. Because there were fewer meaningful
electoral reasons for members to shirk responsibility or delegate authority than there are now, the
sort of ambition that Madison sought to channel was far more prevalent within the institution.
Despite the lower house’s inherently democratic character, election to the House of
Representatives did not mean that members were expected to simply act as a microphone for the
preferences of their constituents.66 Rather, as Madison indicated in Federalist 57, they were
expected to use their presumed wisdom “to pursue the common good of society” and to maintain
constitutional boundaries.67 If they failed to do so, then they could of course still be held
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accountable on election day. However, as Pasley points out, Congressmen of this era were far
less concerned with the day to day and week to week responses of constituents, which in turn
allowed members to focus on institutional strength.68 While Senators were nominated by state
legislatures at the time, and therefore had an obligation to represent state interests, their longer
terms provided them with plenty of insulation to defend the institutional interests of their
chamber. Furthermore, although all members of Congress were elected directly or indirectly and
subject to democratic constraints, these were relatively weak.
An important consequence of this more distant representative-constituent relationship
was that the sort of ambition that Tocqueville recognized in aristocratic nations could be, at least
to an extent, exemplified in Congress. A clear ruling elite existed in American politics and many
of its members were in Congress. Moreover, while Congress could not do as much policy-wise
as it can now, it took far greater ownership of the duties and prerogatives it did possess. The two
most clear examples of this can be seen in Congress’s handling of “its war and spending powers”
throughout the late 18th and 19th centuries.69 Substantive control over both of these areas
belongs to the executive branch in contemporary politics, however, it was not always this way.
As Fisher notes, until the 20th century, every single American military engagement was
authorized by Congress either by formal declaration or by statute.70 Even in the face of ambitious
presidents like Jefferson and Polk, Congress took full ownership of its war powers and, as a
result, was able to successfully defend them. Furthermore, Congress handled its spending
authority in a similar fashion. Keeping “the power of the purse” lodged in the legislature was a
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crucial part of the Framers’ design and also provided Congress with a powerful tool to defend its
institutional interests against the executive branch whenever necessary.71 Early Congresses
recognized this, and defended their authority over taxing and spending against executive efforts
at usurpation throughout the 19th century.72 While modern Congress still has a great deal of
control over spending, it exercises nowhere near the amount of control over the budget that
earlier Congresses did and much of this authority has been delegated to the president.73
Furthermore, these two areas provide clear examples of early congressional strength and modern
congressional decline.
The Decline of Legislative Strength
To preface this section, it is necessary to point out that there were plenty of examples of
executive overreach that Congress either ignored, supported, or was unable to stop prior to the
20th century. For example, Jefferson agreed to spend a large sum of money on the Louisiana
territory without congressional approval, Andrew Jackson was a notoriously strong president
who was called “King Andrew” by his political opponents, and Lincoln’s aggressive unilateral
actions during the Civil War were well-documented. The reason that this section is rooted in the
early 20th century rather than any of these periods is that it was not until then that American
government began to make the lasting and fundamental changes that have left the federal system
in its contemporary, executive-dominated form.
As mentioned earlier, the Industrial Revolution brought about a number of changes in
American society that significantly altered the way many citizens thought about the state and its
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role in their daily lives. The skepticism of powerful, centralized government which had animated
American political thought since before the Declaration of Independence was replaced by
concerns born out of more modern trends. These included the growth of cities, the decline of
American agriculture, increases in immigration, and the new labor situation that came as a result
of industrialization.74 The political manifestation of this sentiment took its form in the early
Progressive movement. As Pestritto points out, Progressives emphasized efficiency,
responsiveness, and “expertise” over the values of deliberation, restraint, and institutional
competition that informed the political thought of Madison and the Framers and that are reflected
in the Constitution.75 According to the Progressive movement’s intellectual leaders, for example
Woodrow Wilson and John Dewey, classical republican values had become antiquated and a
system based on them could not properly serve its citizens. In his lengthy tract on comparative
government, The State, Wilson argued that modern government should be a tool to help citizens
actively pursue personal well-being.76 This was a shift from the traditional liberal view that the
fundamental purpose of government was to secure liberties that predated the state, and therefore
the Progressive vision would require meaningful changes in the structure of the American system
to be executed.
Progressive ideas naturally appealed to a number of people who were threatened by the
economic and cultural changes brought on by the Industrial Revolution. As a result, numerous
Progressives were lifted into positions of influence. Politically, strains of Progressive ideology
ran through both major parties by the early 20th century. For example, Republican President
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Teddy Roosevelt worked extensively to enact reforms that increased the federal government’s
role in economic activity. Although Roosevelt was succeeded by fellow Republican William
Howard Taft, Taft was far more mild in his Progressive crusading and generally stuck to
Antitrust enforcement.77 President Taft’s modest approach to the presidency resulted in a 1912
challenge from Roosevelt, who was discontent with Taft’s first term. After failing to recapture
the Republican nomination, Roosevelt started a third party, which was called the Progressive
“Bull Moose” party.78 Roosevelt’s efforts resulted in a split between Progressive Republicans,
who flocked to the third party, and traditional Republicans, who stuck with Taft. This allowed
Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic candidate, to ascend to the White House on a platform even
more fundamentally Progressive than Roosevelt’s.
Furthermore, in the 20 years from 1901 to 1921, presidents from both major parties who
were decidedly Progressive governed during 16 of them. While the presidencies of both
Roosevelt and Wilson more or less contributed to the weakening of the legislature, it remains
true that Congress, which was also heavily influenced by the Progressive wave, was willing to
cede its own authority during this era and did so on numerous occasions.
Many policies favored by Progressives, most of which involved heavy federal regulation
of economic activity, could not be feasibly enacted by Congress itself.79 For one, extensive
regulatory activity by Congress would be extremely time consuming and require a level of
specific policy knowledge that most members simply did not possess. Therefore, the execution
of Progressive policy preferences at the federal level all but required Congress to delegate some

Peri E. Arnold, Remaking the Presidency: Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson, 1901-1916 (Topeka, KS: University Press
of Kansas, 2009), 71.
78
Arnold, 2-21.
79
Pestritto, 1.
77

22

authority to administrative agencies and the president. There were numerous pieces of legislation
passed by Congress during this era that either formed new administrative agencies or gave
existing ones more policymaking authority. For example, the Interstate Commerce Commission,
or ICC, was established in 1887 during the early stages of the Progressive movement.80 In 1906,
Congress passed the Hepburn Act, which strengthened the ICC considerably by giving it the
ability to fix railroad rates.81 Four years later, the Mann-Elkins Act was enacted. This gave the
ICC the authority to regulate other public accomodations in a similar fashion to railroads.82
Again, this is significant because this is not Congress assuming expansive powers for itself, but
rather delegating its explicit constitutional ability to “regulate Commerce...among the several
states” to a bureaucratic regulatory agency.83 While such a move could be considered ambitious
in the sense that it expanded federal authority, it comes into direct conflict with Madison’s
explanation of institutional ambition in Federalist 51 and fits better with Tocqueville’s
understanding of the concept and its relationship with centralization.
Although a reasonable argument can be made that legislation like the Hepburn Act and
Mann-Elkins Act were a necessary response to the economic situation brought about by the
Industrial Revolution, this abdication of legislative duty was constitutionally questionable, to put
it mildly, and continues to have serious ramifications for current American politics. Moreover, if
Congress would have expressed ambition in the Madisonian sense during this era, then it would
have attempted to exercise as much control over policy as possible. Instead, it gave control to a
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regulatory agency. Congress took similar action with the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act,
which established the FTC and provided it with considerable authority over the regulation of big
business and consumer products.84 Like the Hepburn and Manns-Elkins legislation, this was a
significant example of congressional abdication.
Furthermore, it would a crime to discuss the impact of the early Progressive movement
on the institutional nature of Congress without at least touching on the 17th Amendment to the
Constitution. Ratified in 1913, the 17th Amendment took the authority to elect Senators away
from state legislatures and required popular elections for the Senate in each state. This massive
shift in electoral incentives naturally influences the behavior of Senators, and recent scholarship
has confirmed this. For example, Bernhard and Sala found that Senators became far more
concerned with reelection following the amendment’s ratification and that this resulted in a
measurable difference in Senate voting patterns, especially close to election day.85 Furthermore,
the work of Crook and Hibbing produced similar results, as they argue that the 17th Amendment
essentially transformed the Senate in a smaller version of the House of Representatives.86 This
dilutes the Senate’s ability to play its intended, deliberative role and thus prevents Senators from
properly expressing the sort of ambition that Madison thought necessary to preserving the right
balance of authority between the three branches.87
The political success of the Progressives during this era resulted not in the overhaul of the
Madisonian Constitution, but rather the bastardization of it. With the exception of the 17th
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Amendment, the fundamental structure of the Constitution had been left untouched. Still, the
operation of American government had changed significantly in practice. This had serious
ramifications for Congress’s will and ability to defend Article One prerogatives, and this became
even more apparent throughout the rest of 20th century.
Public distaste with the Wilson presidency and U.S. involvement in World War I proved
to be the undoing of the Progressive era. Republican Warren G. Harding was elected president in
1920 promising a “return to normalcy,” and his successor, Calvin Coolidge, is most famous for
his modest style of governing.88 While it is true that some of the intense economic restrictions of
the Wilson and Roosevelt years were rolled back during the Harding and Coolidge presidencies,
no reversion to 19th century norms ever took place. For example, the Harding administration
strongly supported the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which gave the executive branch the
formal authority to draft the initial budget.89 Although Congress did retain final say over the
budget, this law still gave the President a major role in what had historically been a strictly
legislative matter.90
Furthermore, while the trends of congressional delegation and executive aggrandizement
slowed down throughout the 1920s, they certainly did not stop and were reignited as soon as the
decade came to a close. The emergence of the Great Depression in 1929 spurred a public demand
for government intervention that was far more amplified than the similar sentiment that came out
of the Industrial Revolution and the Progressive era. Furthermore, Progressive influence was
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obvious in the construction of President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, which Congress began
enacting at rapid pace after his inauguration in 1933.
While a lengthy book could be written about the degree to which Congress delegated
away its authority during the 1930s, I seek here to cover only the aggregate impact and to make
an attempt to explain this in the context of Madison’s theory of ambition. Oddly enough, quite a
few members of Congress were extremely ambitious in terms of their willingness to engage in
the technical parts of the legislative process during the early and mid 1930s. While the
widespread suffering brought about by the depression made some sort of government action
inevitable and FDR was an active executive by any measure, some of the earlier bills that were
part of the New Deal package were the exclusive handiwork of Congress and, to some extent,
demonstrated legislative strength.91
Still, a vast majority of the legislation that came out of this period served to do at least
one of two things: aggrandize the president or delegate legislative authority to regulatory
agencies. Most of the economic policies favored by FDR and his Democratic allies in Congress
involved heavy intervention into market activity. Again, these sorts of policies require far too
much oversight and expertise to be handled exclusively by Congress at the federal level and the
public demand for action was too great for the naturally deliberative and slow-moving legislative
process. Thus, delegation ensued.92 Congress began creating numerous administrative agencies
that had significant control over various policy areas and that could be directed by the president
with a simple stroke of his pen. These included the Federal Works Agency, the Civilian
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Conservation Corps, and National Recovery Administration, among a plethora of others.
Although the roots of the modern administrative state were laid in the Progressive era, most
scholars recognize the New Deal as its formal birth.93
Initially, the Supreme Court tried to put a stop to the Executive branch’s exercise of
legislative power. For example, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, the Court struck down executive action under the National Industrial
Recovery Act, with the majority arguing in Schechter that Congress had provided President
Roosevelt with near “unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or
advisable for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade and industry,” and that this was
constitutionally impermissible.94 The Courts, however, could only prevent the legislature from
giving away its authority for so long, and 1935 was the last time the Nondelegation doctrine was
employed in a majority opinion.95 After this, the Court became far less willing to interfere in
these types of questions, especially if they involved economic policy. This was due, at least in
part, to public backlash against the Court, but also to the threat of FDR’s infamous Court
Packing Scheme.96 Essentially, Roosevelt wanted Congress to a pass a law that would allow him
to load the Court with Justices who shared his ideological views. While there was considerable
backlash against this and the proposal never became law, the threat was sufficient to thwart the
legal roadblocks of the Nondelegation doctrine and Substantive Economic Due Process.97
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To bring this back into the context of Madison’s Federalist 51, there are a few important
things to point out. Members of Congress during this era could be called ambitious in the sense
that they assumed a broad swath of power under provisions of the Constitution that had
previously been interpreted far more modestly, namely the Commerce Clause and the Elastic
Clause. In pursuit of this kind of ambition, however, Congress failed to defend its institutional
prerogatives and ultimately subordinated itself to a powerful executive branch that the members
had designed themselves through years of legislation that expanded both the powers of the
presidency and the size of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, when Congress did eventually attempt
to push back against President Roosevelt in the late 1930s, the legislature found its ability to do
so hampered.98 They could certainly stifle the White House’s formal legislative efforts, but they
could not effectively slow down the president’s capacity to use the administrative state to his
benefit.99 In other words, Congress had created a quasi-branch of government outside of the
Madisonian design, and the implicit restraints of the Madisonian system did not neatly apply to
it.
To be clear, the problems of limited expertise and efficiency that fueled congressional
delegation during the Progressive era were multiplied by the complexities of the Great
Depression. The oncoming of World War II added to this significantly, and national security
concerns resulted in even more power being shifted to the executive branch.100 It is important to
reemphasize that during national emergencies before the Great Depression and World War II, the
president had assumed great powers before. As mentioned in the introduction to this section,
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President Lincoln took a number of sweeping unilateral actions to direct the Union during the
Civil War, among these the suspension of Habeas Corpus and reinstating the draft.101 Still, after
the war had ended, Congress retained its position as the dominant branch. No such thing
happened after World War II.102 A fundamental transformation had taken place in American
Politics, and the president was the primary benefactor. This was not only because of the large
bureaucracy that was now at the disposal of the executive, but also because a dramatic shift in
public attitudes had occurred. While it had been trending this way in the years prior, after the
attack on Pearl Harbor it was clear that “the presidency was in, and Congress was out.”103
Although both President Roosevelt and Congress enjoyed similarly high approval rates
during Roosevelt’s first two terms, Maney points out that congressional popularity began to
decline significantly following the outbreak of war.104 This only added to the other ambition
inhibiting obstacles that Congress had created through its statutory delegation of authority to the
executive branch. While congressional popularity has varied since then, it is consistently low in
contemporary politics and is useful to explaining the institution’s inability to properly defend
itself now.105 This also fits with Tocqueville’s predictions regarding centralization. As he pointed
out numerous times, democratic citizens care primarily about their own economic self-interest
and, over time, tend to push political authority towards a single institution.106 The public nature
of FDR’s presidency, combined with the circumstances of war and economic struggle, made
strong executive leadership alluring. Aside from the difficulties it had created for itself through
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New Deal legislation, Congress also had little incentive to attempt to reclaim its former strength,
as the public had accepted the legislature as a political actor subordinate to the president.107
Furthermore, this trend continued past Word War II, and the lack of institutional ambition
in modern Congress has never been more clear than it was in 1953, when President Truman
unilaterally committed troops to Korea without consequence. As discussed in earlier sections, the
authority to declare war had always belonged to and been exercised by Congress rather
uncontroversially.108 However, Truman was able to assume this power for himself with little
meaningful pushback and every president since has exercised the war power similarly.109
Although there have always been a few members of Congress who at least pay lip service to the
idea that this is an example of executive overreach whenever it happens, no effective action has
been taken to curb presidential war powers.110 The institutional will to reclaim this authority in
any meaningful way simply does not exist, as this would require an assumption of great
responsibility by members of Congress that would likely complicate electoral goals. On top of
this, there is little public interest in this issue and most of the debate over it is left to
constitutional scholars and lawyers. This speaks to Tocqueville’s concerns about ambition and
democratic citizenship.111 When a political issue comes across as abstract or distant, an
unengaged public will tend to ignore it even if it is of vital significance. As Becker would argue,
this results in a Congress that mimics this attitude, especially as the aristocratic elements of the
institution decay.112 As a result, control is consolidated in the branch with the most ambitious
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actors, which in this case has been the executive. Furthermore, the war powers issue perfectly
exemplifies the current relationship between the president and Congress and how it has
developed since the middle of the 20th century.
Although there was some effort to push back against the abuse of presidential war powers
and presidential supremacy more generally around the time of the Watergate Scandal in the
1970s, this effort was fleeting and ineffectual in the long-term. The War Powers Resolution of
1973 was passed over President Nixon’s veto, however if anything it made executive war powers
more formidable by statutorily legitimizing presidential claims that he could move first in
committing troops without prior legislative approval.113 Recent presidents, including Obama and
Trump, have even been able to get away with ignoring the limited requirements of the War
Powers Resolution altogether.114
If Madison’s theory of ambition were to function properly in any of these examples, then
Congress would have used any number of the considerable tools granted to it in Article One of
the Constitution to prevent its subordination to the president as an institution. Clearly, however,
it has not done so. Throughout both the transformative Progressive and New Deal eras, Congress
sought to expand the scope of its actual policy authority to respond to new complexities in
American social and economic life. This effort required both policy expertise and a willingness
to micromanage, and Congress possessed neither. This, combined with Progressive hostility
towards key facets of the Madisonian system and the public desire for immediate action, led to
the rise of the administrative state and serious increases in presidential power.
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Initially, a strong argument could be made that congressional delegation was fueled by
ambition. Congress sought to gain control over areas of policy that previously belonged to state
governments throughout the Progressive and New Deal eras, and it did so successfully. Still, this
was not the sort of ambition that Madison’s theory relies on, which involves keeping
constitutional authorities “in their proper places.”115 If Congress had exhibited Madisonian
ambition, it would have shouldered as much of the burden as possible, or at least delegated
power to actors that it could easily control. This, however, is not what happened. As more actual
legislative authority has been given away and incentive structures have changed, members of
Congress continue to lack the sort of institutional pride that once played an important stabilizing
role in early interbranch relations and that Madison had great faith in. Furthermore, the long-term
consequence of this has been a weak and ineffectual Congress in the 21st century and the rise of
increasingly ambitious executives.
The State of Modern Congress and Conclusion
While these problems with Congress stemming out of the 20th century have continued in
contemporary politics, the more recent trend of intense partisan polarization is worth discussing
in terms of legislative decline. As I touched on briefly in the literature review, a number of
scholars have identified polarization as a barrier that Congress has been unable to overcome in
its efforts to counter presidential power. For example, if a president takes constitutionally
problematic unilateral action, it is very unlikely that his partisan allies in Congress would be
willing to stand it against it so long as it goes with their policy preferences. Because the modern
president is also undoubtedly the leader of his party, partisan members of Congress might see
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their electoral fate as being inexorably tied to the president.116 This provides a powerful incentive
to fall in line, especially for members of the party establishment.
The congressional response to President Trump’s recent emergency declaration
concerning border security provides a perfect example of this. After a lengthy government
shutdown in which the White House failed to sway the Democrat controlled House of
Representatives to provide it with 5.7 billion dollars to begin construction on a wall along the
U.S.-Mexico, Trump decided to claim this money unilaterally from funds that were allocated to
the Pentagon.117 Despite this being an emergency declaration, Trump seemed to downplay this
part of it, stating that he “didn’t need to do this” and that he “just wanted to get it done faster.”118
In other words, the president found himself frustrated with the legislative process, and decided to
circumvent it. While some Republican members of Congress expressed concerns about the
constitutionality of Trump’s declaration and a bill that would have overturned it passed through
both the House and Senate, Trump was able to use his veto power knowing that Congress lacked
the will to override it and prevent the usurpation of its legislative authority.119 Similar events
took place during Obama’s presidency when he issued Executive Orders that essentially rewrote
immigration law, however on that occasion it was Democrats in Congress who were unwilling to
cross the president.120
If Madison’s theory of ambition was still relevant in contemporary politics, it is hard to
imagine that either of these things could have happened. A crucial part of the ambition theory is
Daniel P. Klinghard, "Grover Cleveland, William McKinley, and the Emergence of the President as Party
Leader," Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2005), 736-760.
117
Taylor, 1.
118
Donald J. Trump, "National Emergency Declaration" (speech, Washington, D.C., February 15, 2019).
119
Erica Werner, "House Fails to Override Trump Veto on Southern Border Emergency," Washington Post, March
26, 2019.
120
Elizabeth Slattery, "Obama Can't Rewrite the Law," Washington Post, January 13, 2016.
116

33

the stipulation that “the interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of
the place.”121 In other words, allegiance to institution or branch must outweigh allegiance to party
in order for the separation of powers to be truly secure. Modern polarization, especially as it
exists in Congress, significantly undermines this. Particularly in the 21st century, most
congressional efforts to curb presidential power and reclaim legislative authority have been
fueled by partisan animus rather than by genuine concern over the weakness of their own
institutions. As a result, all that is left to prevent the concentration of political power in the
executive branch and the administrative state are the “parchment barriers” that Madison himself
argued were insufficient.122
While Madison’s theory was always fragile, it proved effective for a long period of time.
It’s true undoing only came about when Congress sought to modernize and expand its reach
through delegation. Congressional expressions of institutional ambition in the early 20th century
took the shape of interpreting Article One extremely broadly and then passing the ability to make
policy under this expanded definition to some other actor in the federal government. In a perfect
Madisonian world, members of Congress would have assumed as much responsibility as possible
so that they could maximize their power within constitutional limits. Although the
aforementioned complexities that came along with the Industrial Revolution and the New Deal
were admittedly significant, this does not act as a justification for Congress’s steady abdication
of its constitutional responsibilities. As the 19th century Congresses demonstrated, power can
naturally ebb and flow between the executive and legislative branches depending on the political
situation, however Congress must be capable of assuming its rightful place in the Madisonian
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system after times of crisis or rapid change are over. Contemporary Congresses have been unable
to do this, and as a result the administrative state remains a powerful policymaking agent and
presidents can get away with murder when it comes to unilateral action.
In order to understand the current state of separated powers, it is more helpful to look
through the lens of Tocqueville than Madison. The sort of elite ambition that Madison assumed
would keep one branch of government from usurping the authority of the others is nowhere to be
found, however the trends of centralization and weak citizenship that Tocqueville foresaw are
overwhelming in current American politics. There is no indication that either of these things will
change anytime soon, and it seems safe to say that Madison’s theory of ambition is no longer a
useful way to understand interbranch relations. It would be extremely healthy for the Republic if
Congress were able to demonstrate a degree of institutional ambition and take back control over
things like the war power and commercial regulation. However, the lack of widespread public
concern over this and the informal changes to the American Constitution stemming out of the
Progressive era and the New Deal make it likely that members of Congress will continue
expressing their ambition electorally, and nowhere else.
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